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I. INTRODUCTION
Many businessmen and lawyers believe that lawyers are well-qualified
to serve as corporate directors. Corporations ask legal counsel to serve on
their boards because they believe it beneficial to the company. Counsel
usually brings to his board position considerable knowledge of the
corporation's business as well as of its legal problems.
In today's climate of expanded director liability under both state and
federal law, lawyer-directors must expect to be targets of litikation.
Regulatory authorities are extending the concepts of professional liability
which compound when lawyers serve in the dual roles. Enough problems
have emerged that lawyer organizations are studying this area in depth.'
This article will consider the extent to which lawyers function in this
dual capacity and the basis for opposition to the practice. It will note the
constraint upon advocates and corporate legal advisers when they
undertake to serve as corporate directors. It will discuss some of the more
important complications that a lawyer faces when he puts on the second
hat of a corporate director, including (1) the difficulty of identifying his
corporate client; (2) the decision to be an "inside" or "outside" director and
the probable increase in his legal liability; (3) problems relating to
responses by his law firm to auditors' requests for information; (4) his
compounded liability under the securities laws; (5) the loss of his
independence; (6) the probable loss of the attorney-client privilege; (7) his
status as a deputy for his law firm; (8) significant conflicts of interest; and
(9) questions of liability insurance coverage for the multiple risks he
undertakes.
Without reaching a specific conclusion on the principal question, the
article recognizes an apparent trend toward the view that major suppliers
of services to a corporation, such as lawyers, investment bankers,
accountants and commercial bankers probably should be excluded from
board membership, at least until more definitive decisions clear the air.
II. LAWYER-DIRECTORS
A. A Widespread Practice
Two thousand major corporations paid more than $270 million in
1977 to 1200 law firms whose partners also served as directors or officers of
those companies. This information, disclosed under regulations of the
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC; Commission), did not in-
clude corporations not publicly listed. Although, as these figures indicate,
the lawyer-director practice is common, a 1978 survey reported that more
companies had eliminated the double relationship with their lawyers from
1976 to 1978 than in the previous two-year period. The reasons given for
this decline in lawyer-directors included "the outward appearance and
potential for criticism." One prominent Washington lawyer recalled the
old maxim, "the lawyer who has himself for a client has a fool for a client,"
yet that same lawyer was listed as an inside partner, the term applied in the
survey to lawyers serving in the dual capacity of lawyer-director. This list
of inside partners included some of the most prestigious names at the
American bar.
Mr. Justice Stewart has spoken of "the need for the brightest possible
line of demarcation between the function of a lawyer in giving professional
counsel to his client, and the function of corporate management in
carrying on the corporation's business in the profit-making interests of its
stockholders.",5 The lawyer who serves in the dual capacities of corporate
counsel and corporate director must either straddle that line or walk it as a
tightrope. As he does so, the propriety of his dual capacity remains, in Mr.
Justice Stewart's words, "a vexing problem of professional responsibili-
ty." 6
B. The Problem in Context
To put our problem in proper context, let us suppose that Mr.
Clarence Counselor and Mr. Abner Advocate are senior partners in a
mythical, prestigious law firm that is general counsel for a Fortune 500
corporation listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Its chief executive
officer tells the law firm that the corporation wants either Mr. Counselor or
Mr. Advocate to become a member of the company's board of directors.
Such a request is usually deemed to be a command; it contemplates that
the law firm will continue as general counsel for the corporation.
We begin our discussion with the declaration of the Business
Roundtable that 't]he first corporate obligation . . . -an obligation to
both owners and employees-is profitable operation. ' As a corporate
director, Mr. Counselor or Mr. Advocate will undertake that as his own
first obligation; as a business lawyer, he will expect to provide his total
ability and effort to his client. He must be competent as a professional in
providing legal advice for the businessman who retains him.
3. Id.
4. Lavine, supra note 2, at 6, col. 1.
5. Stewart, Professional Ethics for the Business Lawyer: The Morals of the Market Place, 31
Bus. LAW. 463, 464 (1975).
6. Id.
7. Statement ofthe Business Roundtable-The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors
of the Large Publicly Owned Corporations, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2100 (1978).
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Does the lawyer-director's dual role prevent his strict adherence to a
lawyer's principles of objectivity and independence? Can he better serve
the public interest than by giving the best possible legal advice to his
clients?8
The questions are not really that easy. Management hires and fires
corporate counsel. Counsel has the function of identifying risks and
alerting the corporate decision-makers to the legal consequences of taking
risks. Can counsel expect his fellow directors to accept his identification of
risks as an independent legal judgment if, as a director, he decides to go
along with a managment proposal which he, as counsel, defines to be
legally hazardous? If counsel follows his own legal advice, and votes
against management, is he properly performing his director's function?
Perhaps of equal importance, can he act independently and still protect his
law firm's economic interest in maintaining the corporation as its client?
It has been suggested that when corporate counsel becomes a director,
even the selection of his law firm to perform services for the corporation
may be subject to challenge. 9 Certainly, fees charged by the law firm should
be scrutinized for fairness, with the burden of supporting the fairness
imposed upon the law firm.10
C. Advocate or Advisor
While putting our problem in context, we suggested that either of two
partners in our mythical law firm-Clarence Counselor or Abner
Advocate-could be named to the corporation directorship. That choice
may have some significance. Although a lawyer may serve simultaneously
as an advocate and as an adviser, the two roles are essentially different.
Historically, lawyers have been viewed principally as advocates. The
Code of Professional Responsibility gives an advocate the widest possible
latitude. The advocate "may urge any permissible construction of the law
favorable to his client, without regard to his professional opinion as to the
likelihood that the construction will ultimately prevail. 11 He should
resolve in his client's favor all doubts regarding the bounds of the law.)2 He
may take any position supported by the law or "supportable by a good
faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of the law."'
3
The lawyer's traditional role as an advocate is inconsistent with the
modern practice of the corporate lawyer, who sometimes acts more as an
auditor than an advocate. The corporate lawyer must be acutely aware of
his duties to those relying on his expert opinion on matters concerning the
8. Stewart, supra note 5, at 468.
9. Ruder, The Case Against the Lawyer-Director 30 (Special Issue) Bus. LAw. 51, 54 (1975)
(panel discussion on Lawyers as Directors).
10. Id.
11. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL Emics No. 7, E-C 7.4 [hereinafter cited as ABA CANo%s].
12. Id., E-C 7-3.
13. Id., E-C 7-4.
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client corporation. 4 It has been suggested that the corporate lawyer "will
have to exercise a measure of independence that is perhaps uncomfortable
if he is also the close counselor of management in other matters, often
including business decisions." 5 In his practice, the corporate lawyer
represents corporations whose shares are held by members of the public,
either directly or as participants in retirement plans, mutual funds and the
like, and whose business activities affect large numbers of employees and
the national economy. He is usually indispensible to the consummation of
securities transactions and many business transactions, in which his legal
opinion is a customary condition of the closings. 6
As to our Mr. Counselor, the code of Professional Responsibility
views the legal adviser's rights and duties in contradistinction to those of
the advocate. He primarily assists his client in determining the course of
future conduct and relationships.17 The legal adviser is expected to opine
what the courts will ultimately decide to be the applicable law and inform
his client of the practical effect of such a decision.' He may not knowingly
assist the client in engaging in illegal conduct or take a frivolous legal
position.' 9 He must act competently and is prohibited from engaging in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. 2
Even if the corporation has an in-house legal staff competent to
handle most of its legal problems, excluding litigation, it is likely that Mr.
Counselor, the adviser, rather than Mr. Advocate will be selected to serve
on its board. When Mr. Counselor puts on this second hat, he faces new
complications, some of which will be the subject of further consideration.
D. Complications Facing the Lawyer-Director
1. Who is the Client?
The corporate lawyer has obligations to the various financial interests
involved in the corporate business.2' He is told by the Canons that he owes
"his allegiance to the entity [the corporation] and not to a stockholder,
director, officer, employee, representative, or other pe:rson connected with
the entity., 22 However, it is not always easy to define the entity's interest in
contrast to that of the others mentioned. Thus his obligations to those
others must be dealt with on their merits.
In identifying a corporate lawyer's client, judicial recognition of the
rights of stockholders, and the obligations of directors and lawyers to
defend those rights, has raised stockholders to a preferred position.2 3 If
their corporation is not managed in a lawful manner and for their benefit,
the corporation's lawyer will be obligated to disclose these facts to the
14. Gates & Zilly, Legal Malpractice, in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 311,318 (ABA Standing
Committee on Continuing Education of the Bar 1978).
15. Sommer, The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] FED. S-c. L. REP. (CCH) 79,631, at 83-689.
16. Frank, A Higher Duty:A New Look at the Ethics of the Corporate Lawyer, 26 CLaV. ST. L.
REv. 337, 339-40 (1977).
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stockholders. When counsel serves as a director and corporate counsel, no
allegiance to his position in management will allow him to conceal
management's derelictions from the stockholders, and this may require
him to disclose his own transgressions as a part of management.
The traditional concept that corporate counsel's first allegiance is
strictly to the entity,24 and thus to management, has been eroded by recent
court decisions. Of primary concern is Garner v. Wolfinbarger, in which
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the strict entity position
asserted by the American Bar Association in its amicus curiae brief.26 The
case dealt with the availability of attorney-client privilege in a shareholder
class and derivative action against the company and its management.
Holding that any privilege would arise not "from the position of the
corporation as a party but its status as a client,' 27 the court noted that
"management does not manage for itself and that the beneficiaries of its
action are the stockholders., 28 The court concluded that a corporate
attorney represents joint clients, the corporation and its stockholders.29
An earlier decision of the Second Circuit took an important step in the
same direction when that court found "no justification for interposing the
corporate fiction between the directors and the minority stockholders who
were the victims of the directors' fraudulent actions."30 The trend of the
federal decisions is to recognize that the duty of a corporate lawyer runs
not only to the corporate entity but also to its stockholders and, at least in
certain circumstances, to the public. 3t
2. Insider or Outsider: Increase in Liability
When retained outside counsel for a corporation becomes a member
of its board, does he serve as an"inside" or an"outside" director? The ABA
17. ABA CANONS, supra note 11, No. 7, E-C 7-3.
18. Id., E-C 7-5.
19. Id.
20. Shipman, The Needfor SEC Rules to Govern the Duties and Civil Liabilities of Attorneys
Under the Federal Securities Statutes, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 231, 271 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Ship-
rnan 1].
21. Marsh, Relations with Management and Individual Financial Interests, 33 Bus. LAw. 1227
(1978).
22. ABA CANONS, supra note 11, No. 5, E-C 5-18.
23. See notes 71-89 and accompanying text infra.
24. ABA CANONS, supra note 11, No. 5, E-C 5-18.
25. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971). See also Garner v.
Wolfinbarger, 56 F.R.D. 499 (S.D. Ala. 1972).
26. 430 F.2d at 1102.
27. Id. at 1097.
28. Id. at 1101.
29. See also Shipman, Professional Responsibilities of the Corporate Law yer, in PROFESSIONAL
REsPONSIBILITY 271, 275 (ABA Standing Committee on Continuing Education of the Bar 1978)
[hereinafter cited as Shipman II].
30. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 215 (2d Cir. 1968).
31. Frank, supra note 16, at 350, 352.
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Corporate Director's Guidebook calls him an "affiliated non-management
director. 32 In Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp.,33
however, the court termed him a management director rather than an
outside director. He "was so intimately involved . . . that to treat him as
anything but an insider would involve a gross distortion of the realities of
Leasco's managment.
3 4
In the SEC's proposed amendments to its reporting requirements, the
Commission proposed to require that the proxy statement relating to the
annual election of directors identify nominees as "management directors,"
"affiliated nonmanagement directors," or "independent directors.""
Under that proposal, the term "affiliated nonmanagement director" would
have included "any person who is a member or employee of, or is
associated with, a law firm which is proposed to be, or within the last two
years has been, retained by the corporation. 36 Because of objections to the
proposed categorization of directors, the Commission withdrew the
requirements and, taking the opposite view, now cautions against the use
of labels because of their misleading nature.37 It is significant, however,
that the Commission continues to require disclosure in the proxy
statement of the relationship of such lawyers to the corporation issuing the
statement.38 The Commission takes the position that there are "inherent
conflicts faced by lawyers who serve both as directors and as counsel to
corporations .... 09
It seems likely that the corporate attorney who acts as lawyer and
director must face the reality that he will be held to the same standard of
care as inside directors.40 In addition, he will be held to a standard of care
commensurate with his knowledge of the law, his special skills as a bilsiness
lawyer, and his probable involvement with the matter at hand.41 Thus his
duty will be to exercise "such care as the ordinarily prudent lawyer-director
would use under similar circumstances in a like position. '' 2 As Judge
McLean appeared to insist in Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp,: "A
director who possesses some special expertise-such as a lawyer,
32. ABA, CORPORATE DIRECTOR's GUIDEBOOK, reprinted in 33 Bus. LAW. 1591,1620 (1978). Tile
Guidebook does not address the issue whether a lawyer should serve on his client's board of directors,
33. 332 F. Supp. 544, 575-76 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
34. Id. at 576.
35. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-14970 (July 18, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] F D.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,645, at 80,578-79.
36. Id. at 80,578.
37. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15384 (Dec. 6, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC,
L. REP. (CCH) 81,766, at 81,092-93 (Schedule 14A, Note to Item 6(b)(7)).
38. Id. at 81,092 (Schedule 14A, Item 6(b)(4)).
39. Id.
40. Harris, The Case for the Lawyer-Director, 30 Bus. LAW. 58,59 (1975) (panel discussion on
Lawyers as Directors).
41. Ruder, supra note 9, at 55.
42. W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICER AND DIRECTORS 427 (3d ed. 1978).
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accountant or real estate specialist-is expected to apply this expertise to
those board deliberations involving his specialty."43
The Committee on Grievances of the New York City Bar Association
maintains that "a line executive who is a lawyer has an even graver
obligation, as one who knows the law, to stand against practices that
betray the trust upon which the very life of our business economy
depends.""
To like effect is the comment of the American Bar Association
Committee that under Section 35 of the Model Business Corporation Act,
"the special background and qualifications a particular director may
possess, as well as his other responsibilities (or their absence) in the
management of the business and affairs of the corporation, may place a
measure of responsibility upon such director . . . which may differ from
that placed upon another director.,
45
The corporate lawyer who does little more than prepare documents,
tend to their proper execution, and give strictly legal advice on questions
presented to him will have substantially less potential liability than the
more active participant in corporate affairs. 46 A lawyer-director who goes
beyond that role is in a different position.47 The distinction was noted by
the Ninth Circuit in relieving a corporate lawyer, who was not a director,
from liability in a monopolization case because he did not, acting by
himself orjointly with others, make policy decisions for the corporation.4"
A contrary result was reached in a California case. The corporate lawyer
prepared an application for a permit to sell stock; as a director he voted to
file the application; as corporate secretary he signed the application. The
court held that his knowledge of the stock's worthlessness could not be
denied on any theory.49
Professor Morgan Shipman points out that the SEC has successfully
accelerated the trend toward greater duties for outside directors, especially
independent directors. 50 But the lawyer-director whose law firm also serves
as corporate legal counsel will probably be treated as an inside director
whose independence is at least suspect.51
43. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), reprinted in Luce, Responsibilities of Directors Duns
(Nov. 1973).
44. New York Law Journal, April 25, 1974, at 4, col. 5.
45. Report of Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model BUsines Corporation Act,
30 Bus. LAW. 501, 506 (1975).
46. Gates & Zilly, supra note 14, at 326.
47. See Symposium -A Critical Evamination of Sone Evidentiary Privileges, 56 Nw. U..L
Rav. 206, 235 (1961).
48. Tillamook Cheese & Diary Ass'n v. Tillamook County Creamery Assn, 358 F.2d 115, 118
(9th Cir. 1966).
49. Strahan v. Rodney, 97 CaL App. 2d 448, 217 P.2d 711 (1950).
50. Shipman II, supra note 29, at 273. See also Outsiders on the board face an SECsquee:eo
BusINess WEEK, July 16, 1979, at 35.
51. See text accompanying notes 71-87 infra.
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The duties of care of the lawyer-director in dealing with corporate
legal matters, especially securities matters, may be far greater than
common law reasonableness or the standards outlined in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.52 The lawyer-director's familiarity with the
corporation's affairs will probably justify imposing on him responsibilities
similar to those of directors who are officers and full-time employees of the
corporation. 3 As a mere director, he owes a fiduciary duty of utmost
confidence and trust to the corporation, its stockholders, and probably to
the offerees and purchasers of its securities.5 4 In his dual capacity, the
liability of the lawyer-director will be affected by his experience,
knowledge, relationship to the corporation and its management, intimacy
of involvement in its affairs and his awareness of the consequences of
corporate acts.55 The lawyer-director will be expected to be more
professional in his work than would the ordinary director without
professional training.
The lawyer-director can count on being a special target of litigation
and is more apt to be sued as a primary wrongdoer than as an aider and
abettor.56 For example, in a Second Circuit decision, a lawyer who had
gone beyond his professional function as a lawyer by participating in a sale
transaction was held to be within the reach of section 12(2) of the Securities
Act.5
7
3. Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information
The professional auditor must rely upon the corporate lawyer to
supply information needed to formulate an opinion on the financial con-
dition of the company and the results of its operations for the period
included in the financial statements. 58 The chief difficulty of the lawyer in
responding to an auditor's requests lies in the area of contingent liabilities
for unasserted claims.
The lawyer's statements to the accountant must be based on available
facts and information. 9 On that basis, as a lawyer, he has a duty to advise
his client regarding the likelihood that a claim will be asserted. As a
director, in which capacity he acts as the client, the lawyer-director will
have the further duty of considering the possibility of the claim's
52. Gates & Zilly, supra note 14, at 318.
53. W. KNEPPER, supra note 42, at 25.
54. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp.
643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
55. Sommer, Directors and the Federal Securities Laws, "1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc.
L. REP. (CCH) 79,669, at 83,806.
56. See text accompanying notes 79-87 infra.
57. Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969).
58. ABA Section of Corporate, Banking and Business Law, Scope of Lawyers' Responses to
Auditors' Requests for Information, 30 Bus. LAW. 513, 520 (1975) (rev. exposure draft, Aug., 1974).
59. ABA Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Request for
Information, reprinted in 32 Bus. LAW. 177, 180-81 (1976).
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unfavorable outcome and its materiality. 60 The corporate client, through
its management should determine whether to disclose the unasserted
claim to the auditor.61 If the lawyer is also a director, he will be partici-
pating in the determination of the need for such disclosure in the corpora-
tion's financial statement. This appears to broaden the lawyer-
director's responsibilities beyond those generally imposed upon a cor-
porate lawyer under the statement of policy and principles issued by the
American Bar Association and the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants.62
For example, if corporate management were to withhold information
regarding a contingent claim from the company's lawyer and not include it
in the list provided to him, he would have no duty to disclose it to the
auditor.63 If, however, the lawyer were also a corporate director, he would,
presumably, be expected to know of the existence of the claim, the
likelihood of an unfavorable outcome, and its materiality. This knowledge
would probably not be shielded by the attorney-client privilege because it
would have come to the lawyer-director in a business relationship instead
of an attorney-client relationship.64
The lawyer-director may incur particular problems under the
Securities Exchange Act when his firm is required to respond to auditor's
65 6inquiries. In a release dated February 15, 1979,66 the SEC announced the
adoption of two new rules to promote the reliability of information filed by
issuers with the Commission or disseminated to investors.67 One of those
rules prohibits officers and directors'of an issuer from directly or indirectly
making materially false, misleading or incomplete statements to an
accountant in connection with any audit or examination of the financial
statements of the issuer or the filing of any document or report required to
be filed with the Commission." This rule is applicable to any director or
officer of any issuer and relates to oral as well as written communications. 69
Controlling persons of an issuer may be held liable for violative conduct
under section 20 of the Securities Exchange Act.70 It appears that the rule
60. Id. at 180.
61. Id. at 184.
62. See Note, Attorney Responses to Audit Letters: The Problem of Disclosing Loss
Contingencies Arising From Litigation and Unasserted Claims, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 838 (1976).
63. See Auditing Standards Executive Committee, ASCPA, Inquiry ofa Client's Lawyer
Concerning Litigation, Claims, and Assessments, 8 SEc. L. REv. 521, 524 (1976).
64. See Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Fielding, 343 F. Supp. 537, 546 (D. Nv. 1972).
65. See generally W. KNEPPER, supra note 42, at 440.
66. Securities Exchange Release No. 15570 (Feb. 15, 1979) [Current] FED. SEC. L RPa. (CCH)
81,959 (Mar. 1, 1979).
67. Rules 13b2-1 and 13b2-2,44 Fed. Reg. 10970 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13b2-
1, 240.13b2-2).
68. Rule 13b2-2, supra note 67.
69. Securities Exchange Release No. 15570, supra note 66, at 81,400.
70. Id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1976).
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will apply to communications between a law firm and accountants for an
issuer when a partner of the law firm serves as a director of the issuer.
4. Securities Law Problems
Since the decision in BarChris, a doctrine ha; been developing in
securities law that corporate counsel has a duty not only to the corporate
entity and its stockholders but also to the investing public. This duty is
compounded when corporate counsel also serves as a director. For
example, the investigation by a lawyer-director of facts contained in a
registration statement must be of a higher quality and of broader scope
than that of directors generally, and must meet the professional standards
owed by a lawyer to his client.72 Because he is a lawyer as well as a director,
the duties of the lawyer-director extend to both his corporate client and the
investing public. Thus, to avoid liability under section I 1 of the Securities
Act, the lawyer-director would be required to show affirmatively that he
met the statutory requirements of diligence and he could not escape
malpractice exposure by interposing the usual attorney's exculpatory
statements. 73 When wearing both hats, the lawyer-director assumes the
heavy section 11 liabilities of a director while his due diligence defenses
reflect the standards applicable to the attorney-client relationship. 74 For
instance, in BarChris the lawyers were held liable because of their positions
as directors, but the court also made special mention that the dual status of
the lawyers increased their duties of reasonable investigation as directors. 75
A decision based on a rationale similar to BarChris was SEC v.
76Everest Management Corporation. Two attorneys were named as
defendants and charged with securities fraud based on false SEC filings.
One attorney was secretary of a defendant corporation. Again the role of a
lawyer who was an insider by virtue of being a corporate director was
significant. The same year BarChris was decided, the SEC obtained an
injunction against a corporate attorney who did not verify information
furnished him by the directors before including it in a prospectus.77 The
lawyer served his corporate client, but breached his duty to the offerees and
purchasers of the client's securities.7 8
In SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp.,79 defendant Meyer was
71. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
72. Id. at 690, 692, 695-96.
73. Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case, 55 VA. L, Ruv,
1, 37 (1969).
74. Id.
75. Shipman I, supra note 20, at 236.
76. No. 71-4932 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 11, 1971). See also Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F. Supp. 255, 266 (D.
Ore. 1972) (lawyer-director held liable in both capacities where he drafted a prospectus and knew or
should have known that misleading information was set forth without his personal investigation of its
accuracy).
77. SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
78. Id. at 488.
79. 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
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a stockholder and director of Interstate National Corporation, the
company proposed to be merged into National Student Marketing
Corporation. He was also a partner in the Chicago law firm which served
as Interstate's outside legal counsel. Further, he was a personal friend and
legal adviser to Interstate's president, Brown, and served as trustee of
several trusts which held Interstate stock for Brown's children.80
The SEC charged Brown and Meyer with principal violations of the
antifraud provisions of the securities acts in the merger and in subsequent
transactions. The Commission also charged Meyer and one of his lav
partners with secondary liability as aiders and abettors, 8' and their law
firm with vicarious liability because of the lawyers' activity on behalf of the
firm.82 The court found that Brown and Meyer had received information
material to the merger and had "made a conscious decision not to disclose
it."" They "expected to profit handsomely from the merger and the
subsequent stock sales. 84 Brown and Meyer were held in violation of
section 10(b), Rule lOb-5, and section 17 (a) as primary wrongdoers.35 Itis,
of course, possible that Meyer's liability as a primary wrongdoer would
have been imposed even had he not been a director of the corporation, but
that circumstance cannot be ignored.
As to the aiding and abetting charges, the court found that Brown and
"the attorney defendants (Meyer, his law partner, and his law firm)," had
knowledge of the fraud and had provided "knowing, substantial assistance
to the violation" by participating in the closing of the merger.8 6 The court
expressly held that "attorneys cannot rest on asserted'businessjudgments'
as justification for their failure to make a legal decision pursuant to their
fiduciary responsibilities to client shareholders.8z
Despite questions raised by some commentators,8 when a lawyer is
also a director of his client corporation it is likely that he will be charged
with a duty to its stockholders and to the investing public to investigate
information he receives in connection with an SEC registration statement
or other filing, and to disclose any falsities he may discover. Corporate
counsel, however, owes his position to management and, as a director, he
becomes part of management. Because of the division of his loyalties
among those to whom he owes obligations in both capacities, it will
probably be a unique case in which those obligations do not conflict. Even
the corporate lawyer who does not simultaneously serve as a director of his
client corporation must recognize the emerging increase in the division of
80. Id. at 688.
81. Id. at 700.
82. Id. at 701.
83. Id. at 710-11.
84. Id. at 711.
85. Id. at 712.
86. Id. at 712-13.
87. Id. at 713-14.
88. Eg., Karmel, Attorneys' Securities Laws Liabilities, 27 Bus. LAw. 1153, 1160 (1972).
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his loyalties between the corporation and its investors-owners. Moreover,
as Professor Shipman suggests, "management itself is entitled to know the
extent of the attorney's division of loyalties."89
5. What About Independence?
Chairman Harold Williams of the Securities Exchange Commission
has asserted that a "lawyer who is also outside counsel to a corporation,
along with investment bankers, commercial bankers, and others who
might be characterized as 'suppliers' to the corporation, should be
excluded from board membership." 90 He recognizes that "legal counsel
frequently has special knowledge of litigation and other matters of vital
significance to directors," but cites several competing factors:
It is important that we come to grips with the conflict of interest problem
created by the board membership of those whose income, in some significant
measure, depends upon their business dealings with the management; with
the obvious inhibitions on the other members of the board in terminating or
criticizing the service rendered the corporation as a result of another
director's business relationship; and with the public perception problem
created by that conflict. 9'
The point made by Chairman Williams is that outside counsel of the
corporation is not independent of management because his board
membership, in a significant manner, depends upon his dealings with
management. Outside counsel is to some degree, at least, economically
dependent upon the corporation's business in his professional life. 92 Can a
lawyer, in such a position, afford to be an "inside" director of his client
corporation? Should he be a director at all, considering his professional
status, responsibility, and personal liability?
Thirty years ago, one writer expressed the belief that the practice of
lawyers serving as directors of their client corporation was "too
widespread to permit any . .. expectation" of a change. 93 The climate is
different now. Litigation against corporate officers and directors presently
consumes much court time and lawyers are being named as defendants
with increasing frequency.
In the Airlie House Conference on "Ethical Responsibilities of
Corporate Lawyers, 94 the participants considered adding a provision to
the Code of Professional Responsibility which stated that it would be
89. Shipman I, supra note 20, at 286.
90. Williams, Corporate Accountability and the Lawyer's Role, 34 Bus. LAW. 7, 10 (1978).
91. Id. at 10-11.
92. Leech & Mundheim, The Outside Director ofthe Publicly Held Corporation, 31 Bus, LAW,
1799, 1830 (1976).
93. Swaine, Impact of Big Business on the Profession:An Answer to Critics ofthe Modern Bar,
35 A.B.A. J. 89, 170 (1949).
94. The Airlie House Conference on Ethical Responsibilities of Corporate Lawyers, 33 Bus.
Law. 1173 (1978).
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unprofessional for corporate counsel to serve on the board 6fany publicly
held company that he advises.95 Underlying such proposals is the public's
expectation that a corporate lawyer should have a measure of in-
dependence that will permit him to supply high quality legal advice
untainted by conflicts of interest, economic or otherwise.96 This concern is
suggested by the New York Stock Exchange's Audit Committee Policy:
"Directors who are affiliates of the company or officers or employees of the
company or its subsidiaries would not be qualified for Audit Committee
membership. 97
Professor Robert H. Mundheim, who led the Airlie House discussion
of this point, noted that "courts expect more of a lawyer-director than they
do, for example, of a sociology professor-director." 98 Moreover, when the
interests of management and the corporation diverge, the problem is
compounded if the company's lawyer also serves as a director. The dual
role makes it difficult for the lawyer-director to act independently, and it
restrains the freedom of the corporation to change counsel, or to transfer
some business from the lawyer-director's law firm.99
Whether employed as in-house counsel or as a partner in an outside
law firm, a corporation's chief legal counsel must consider and advise the
corporation of all possible adverse legal consequences that may flow from
any laws and regulations and must make legally oriented decisions. If he is,
also a director, he will be obligated to exercise his business judgment,
which may not square with his legal opinion. To complicate matters, he
may be confronted with the risk of losing a valued client, perhaps his only
client.'00 In such a dilemma, can a lawyer-director subject the cor-
poration's problems to a dispassionate and unbiased review in either
capacity?
In the Airlie House discussion following Professor Mundheim's
presentation, the trend was to recognize the seriousness of such problems
and their bearing upon the lawyer's effectiveness in either capacity.' 0' One
panelist who considered it "a little bit unrealistic to think of lawyers as
being entirely independent," inquired: "[I]s a lawyer who is receiving big
fees from a company [and who is] .. .not a director of that company,
likely to be any more independent in advising that company or serving its
management than the same lawyer who serves as a director' 02
He went on to respond to his own question,
95. Mundheim, Should Code of Professional Responsibility ForbidLawyers to Serm on Boards
of Corporations for Which They Act as Counsel, 33 Bus. LAw. 1507 (1978).
96. Id. at 1512.
97. W. KNEPPER, supra note 42, at 801.
98. Mundheim, supra note 95, at 1507.
99. Id. at 1509.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1512 (discussion following Mundheim article).
102. Id. at 1514 (remarks of Kenneth J. Bialkin).
1979]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Now, the lawyer-director has the same duty of loyalty to the corporation as
other directors. He may be friendly and sympathetic to management-he
probably would not be the lawyer or a director if he were not-but he must be
objective and prepared to disagree with management as circumstances
require. . . . In fact, I am aware of examples where it was the lawyer on the
board, acting as a director, who was most vigorous in questioning
management proposals, challenging assumptions, and clarifying issues for
board consideration.10 3
Nonetheless, the discussion disclosed substantial support for the view
that major suppliers of services to a corporation should not serve as
directors, that the corporation's lawyer should attend board meetings, but
should do so as a lawyer only, and that leading law firms follow these
practices.'0 4
6. Attorney-Client Privilege
The clear trend of the decisions is that the policy of the law imposing
fiduciary duties upon directors and officers will override any claim of
attorney-client privilege based on the fact that a director is the
corporation's lawyer.'0 5 One court has stated: "When the attorney and the
client get in bed together as business partners, their relationship is a busi-
ness relationship, not a professional one, and their confidences are
business confidences unprotected by a professional privilege."'1
0 6
The acts of a lawyer-director and his knowledge as a director cannot
be separated from his acts and his knowledge as a partner in his law firm. 10 7
His fiduciary obligations as a director and his professional obligations as a
lawyer cannot "be placed in convenient separate boxes." i0 8 The knowledge
of a corporate director and officer, with respect to transactions in which he
is authorized to act, is imputed to the corporation. Similarly, the
knowledge of a partner in a law firm, gained during confidential
relationships with clients, is imputed to the other partners in the law
firm.'0 9 In a proper case, the files and work processes of the law firm are as
available for discovery as are the files and records of the corporation
itself." °
When the Fifth Circuit, in deciding Garner v Wolfinbarger,"'
refused to apply attorney-client privilege as a "veil of secrecy" between a
corporation's management and its stockholders, it recognized that there
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1511, 1516-18.
105. See, e.g., In re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litigation, 78 F.R.D. 692 (N.D. III.
1978); Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Fielding, 343 F. Supp. 537, 545 (D. Nev. 1972).
106. 343 F. Supp. at 546.
107. Marco v. Dulles, 169 F. Supp. 622,631 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 268 F.2d 192 (1959).
108. Id.
109. Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Fielding, 343 F. Supp, 537, 544 (D. Nov. 1972).
110. E.g., Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974
(1971).
111. Id.
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may be many situations in which the corporate entity or its management,
or both, have interests adverse to those of some or all stockholders." 2 The
court declared that "management judgment must stand on its merits, not
behind an ironclad veil of secrecy which under all circumstances preserves
it from being questioned by those for whom it is, at least in part,
exercised."'" 3 To like effect is the Delaware case in which a controlling
stockholder's general counsel sat as a director of a subsidiary corporation.
Attorney-client privilege was denied as to communications affecting the
interests of minority stockholders."
4
If the lawyer-director is an inside director, as the above discussion
suggests, he will be a part of the corporation's control group, which is
entitled to assert attorney-client privilege in the ordinary situation." 5 The
fiduciary obligations of the lawyer-director to each individual stock-
holder," 6 however, will override the attorney-client privilege where
the two come into conflict. Thus memoranda and opinions prepared by
him will probably be treated as nonprivileged documents provided by a
director rather than confidential advice furnished by a lawyer to his
client. "1 This prospect has startling implications.
7. A Deputy For His Law Firm?
When a partner in an outside law firm that is counsel for a corporation
becomes a member of the client's board of directors, is the arrangement
between the law firm and the corporation so close that the partner-director
can be considered to have been deputized by the law firm as its
representative on the board?" 8 In Lanza v. Drexel & Co.," 9 one of the
BarChris progeny,120 the plaintiff tried to hold the underwriting firm liable
because of breaches of duty by Coleman, a Drexel partner, who was also a
BarChris director. The case raised the question whether Coleman had been
deputized by Drexel to serve as its representative on the BarChris board.
In the district court Judge Frankel also considered the liability of Coleman
and Drexel as controlling persons under section 20 (a) of the Securities
Exchange Act.1
2
112. Id. at 1101.
113. Id.
114. Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361, 368 (D. Del. 1975).
115. See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n,320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.) cert. denied,
375 U.S. 929 (1963).
116. Grognet v. Fox Valley Trucking Service, 45 Wis. 2d 235, 172 N.W.2d 812 (1969).
117. See Hershman, Special Problems of Inside Counsel for Financial Institutlons, 33 Bus.
LAw. 1435, 1440 (1978).
118. Shipman II, supra note 29, at 283-84.
119. [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REp. (CCH) 92,826 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), afftd,479
F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc).
120. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1976). See Shell v. Hensley430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970). Seealso 15 U.S.C.
§ 77(o) that is the comparable provision, section 15, of the Securities Act.
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The concept of deputization has been applied in section 16 (b)'22
short-swing profits cases. For instance, in Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp.
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that Martin Marietta
Corporation, by a resolution of its board of directors, had deputized its
president to represent its interests as a director of Sperry Rand
Corporation. 123 The court held in effect that Martin Marietta, acting
through its president, was a director of Sperry Rand.124 In the same vein, it
has been suggested that a partner in a law firm should not purchase or sell
securities of his firm's corporate client without first making sure that no
inside-information problem exists that might result in Rule 1Ob-5
liability.125
In construing section 15 of the Securities Act and section 20 (a) of the
Exchange Act the courts have focused on the power or potential power of
the alleged controlling person to influence and control the actions of
another. 26 Although something more than respondeat superior has been
required to impose liability in such cases, 127 it seems likely that in a proper
case, a law firm could be held liable as a controlling person for the
dereliction of one of its partners serving as a director of one of its corporate
clients.
8. Significant Conflicts of Interest
Conflicting interests have become of increasing concern in recent
years, and the tactic of demanding the disqualification of trial counsel in
complex business litigation is a recognized technique of trial strategy.1 28 A
predictable by-product of that trend is to question the conflicts
confronting a corporate lawyer who becomes a member of his client's
board of directors.
Professor Andrew Kaufman 29 tells the story of George Templeton
Strong, a partner in the law firm of Cadwalader, Wickersham and Taft,
who was selected to be a director of the Bank for Savings, for which his law
firm was counsel. More than a century ago, he wrote that this meant he
would no longer be able to share in the law firm's earnings derived from
122. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
123. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 265 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S,
1036 (1970).
124. Id. See also Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962); Lowey v. Howmet Corp., 424 F. Supp.
461 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
125. Harris, supra note 40, at 62-63.
126. E.g., Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 890-91 (3d Cir. 1975).
127. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,209 n.28 (1976), reh. denied, 425 U.S. 986(1976); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. Sc. L. REP. (CCH) 92,826
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en bane).
128. E.g., International Business Machines Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978); First
Wisconsin Mortgage Trust v. First Wisconsin Corp., 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978); Cinema 5, Ltd. v.
Cinema, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.,
440 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ohio 1977), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996
(1978).
129. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
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fees paid to it by that bank.130 Such financial screening would probably be
unusual today. It has been said that the "ethical problems of a corporate
law firm are more than the sum of its parts" and that as "the number of
lawyers, clients, and particular matters" increases, "the number of ethical
problems increases exponentially."'' Conflict of interest is, of course, a
primary source of such ethical problems.
It is not unusual, in today's complex business climate, for conflicts of
interest to occur between such groups as controlling majority stockholders
and public minority stockholders, the active promoters of a new business
and the passive suppliers of its capital, incumbent management and
stockholders who seek to replace such management, holders of different
classes of stock, or different factions of stockholders, each seeking to
enhance its own position.132 In such cases, what responsibility does the
corporate attorney have to persons other than the incumbent management
of the corporation? If he is also a director, does that create any additional
conflicts of interest?
3 3
The Code of Professional Responsibility contains language appli-
cable in more or less degree to various circumstances, but it provides
few specific guidelines to particular problems, especially those of the
lawyer-director. In any event, there is no certainty that conformity to the
Code will relieve lawyers of a duty to comply with such higher standards as
courts may deem appropriate. 3 4 The attitude of the SEC that securities
lawyers must be more conscious of their public responsibilities gives the
bar no reason for complacency.
35
In the 1974 revision of the Model Business Corporation Act, the ABA
committee concluded that stockholder and public expectations of
corporate responsibility and director performance require a standard of
care reasonably applicable to every director regardless of the individual's
personal or professional qualifications or how he happened to be chosen
for election. 36 Thus came the standard, "as an ordinarily prudent person
would use under similar circumstances in a like position."13 This standard
follows Judge McLean's position in BarChris3 and takes into considera-
tion a director's special background, qualifications, knowledge, and
expertise.
The corporation's lawyer who serves also as a director must be
130. The Airlie House Conference, supra note 94, at 1191.
131. Cutler, The Role of the Private Law Firin, 33 Bus. LAw. 1549 (1978).
132. W. KNEPPER, supra note 42, at 423; Marsh, supra note 21, at 1227.
133. See discussion in Marsh, supra note 21, at 1228-34.
134. See generally United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796,805-06 (2d Cir. 1969),cert. denied,397
U.S. 1006 (1970); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
135. See e.g., SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
136. Coombe, Lawyers as Directors: Application of Statutory Standard of Care, 30 (Special
Issue) Bus. LAw. 41, 45 (1975) (panel discussion).
137. See W. KNEpaa, supra note 42, at 112-113; Cotnnent on Anendnents to Section35 of the
Model Business Corporation Act, 32 Bus. LAv. 42, 45 (1976).
138. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
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conscious of the potential for conflicting interests in these two roles. He is
admonished, in the words of Mr. Justice Story, to have "no interest, which
may betray his judgment, or endanger his fidelity."' 39 He was probably
chosen as a director by the corporate management, and most likely chosen
by its chief executive. His law firm was also chosen as legal counsel by
management and is responsibile to it in the first instance. 40 The power to
dismiss directors and legal counsel is typically vested in the chief
executive141 so that, in both capacities, the lawyer-director is economically
dependent upon the chief executive. 42 In that respect, however, his
conflicts of interest are probably no greater in the dual capacity than as a
director or as corporate counsel. Also, they are not much different than
those of an outside director who is a lawyer but is not counsel for the
corporation.
It has been said that permitting the corporation's outside legal counsel
to sit on the board severely compromises his objectivity, since he is then
simultaneously attorney and client. 43 Whether that constitutes legal
malpractice has yet to be established, but an action early in 1979 by special
counsel for International Controls Corporation seeks damages from a
Washington law firm for malpractice, for the return of all legal fees, and for
the return of director's fees paid to one of its partners who served on the
ICC board of directors during the time that Robert Vesco directed the
company's operations.
44
What happens when a derivative action or a class action is brought by
stockholders against management to impose liability for securities fraud or
wrongdoing in the management of the corporation? The common practice
has been to allow corporate counsel to represent management and for
independent counsel to appear for the corporation.145 The practice is
justified on the theory that corporate counsel is, in fact, closely allied with
management, the officers and directors have relied upon his advice, and he
should be allowed to defend his own work and advice when it is under
attack. 46 The joint client theory of Garner v. Wolfinbarger147 may
complicate this situation. If the lawyer, qua lawyer or qua director, has a
potential liability to the corporation, his interests could conflict with those
of the corporation and preclude such representation.
48
139. Williams v. Reed, 29 F. Cas. 1386, 1390 (C.C. Maine 1824) (No. 17,733).
140. See Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Model Corporation:
Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CAL. L. REV. 375, 382 (1975).
141. Id. at 408.
142. Id. at 382.
143. Id. at 405.
144. Hager, Clear Skies Aheadfor Hogan and Hartson?, LegalTimes of Wash., Jan. 15,1979, at
28, col. 1, at 2-3.
145. Shipman II, supra note 29, at 280.
146. Id. See Lewis v. Shaffer Stores Co., 218 F. Supp. 238, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Marco v.
Dulles, 169 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y), appeal dismissed, 268 F.2d 192 (1959).
147. See text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
148. Shipman 1, supra note 20, at 256. See also Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976).
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The conflicts are compounded if the lawyer is a defendant in the
action, either qua lawyer or in his dual capacity as lawyer-director. He may
be disqualified from representing the corporation in such a case. 49 When a
lawyer-director and his fellow directors were joined as defendants, the
Second Circuit held that his law firm could not represent all of them. It
found a danger of conflict of interest if the directors should contend they
did only what the lawyer said was lawful, and if the lawyer should contend
that he wrote only what the other directors told him was true.1
50
The trend of the decisions in this area is to resolve all doubts regarding
conflict of interest in favor of the disqualification of the lawyer from
serving as counsel in the litigation.
1 51
9. Liability Insurance Coverage
It is assumed that the lawyer-director's law firm will carry adequate
professional liability insurance' 52 and that the corporation will purchase
directors' and officers' (D & 0) liability insurance with sufficient limits. 53
Nevertheless, the lawyer-director may still have serious problems arising
out of wearing his two hats.
The liabilities a lawyer assumes when acting as a corporate director or
officer are commonly outside his professional liability policy. 54 The policy
usually undertakes to pay all sums which the insured may become legally
obligated to pay on account of any act, error, or omission in professional
services rendered or that should have been rendered and arising out of the
conduct of his profession as a lawyer.155 His services as a corporate director
do not arise out of the conduct of his profession as a lawyer.
The D & 0 policy covers him as a director or officer of the corporation
for loss, with some exclusions, on account of a wrongful act in his capacity
as such director or officer. 156 Legal services are not performed in this
capacity as a director or officer.
If, because of his status as a director, the lawyer-director incurs
liability as a fiduciary under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA) 157 he will need additional liability insurance coverage
under a fiduciary liability insurance policy. ERISA liability will not be
covered by his professional liability policy and probably not by the
corporation's D & 0 policy.
t58
Most professional liability policies exclude coverage for claims
149. Harrison v. Keystone Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 428 F. Supp. 149 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
150. International Elecs. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1296 (2d Cir. 1975).
151. International Business Mach. Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 283 (3d Cir. 1978).
152. W. KNEPPER, supra note 42, at 654-58.
153. Id. at 619-46.
154. Shipman II, supra note 29, at 283.
155. Gates & Zilly, supra note 14, at 332; W. KNEPPER, supra note 42, at 655-56.
156. For a more detailed description of the coverage, see W. KNEPPER, stpra note 42, at628-37.
157. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976).
158. W. KNEPPER, supra note 42, at 646-51, 654-58.
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arising out of securities law violations unless substantial additional
premiums are paid.' 59 This exclusion may deny coverage for transactions
not traditionally thought to involve securities, such as legal work related to
condominium units, community clubs, and limited partnership interests.
Moreover, the exclusion may apply to unregistered securities such as the
shares in a small corporation sold to a limited number of investors.161
When SEC coverage is not excluded, it still may not cover all potential
liability under the securities acts. 16 Much securities litigation is based on
allegations of fraud. The professional liability policy excludes coverage for
dishonest, fraudulent, criminal, or malicious acts or omissions.' 62 In the
D & 0 policy, there is usually an exclusion of loss arising because a director
acted dishonestly or in bad faith with knowledge or reasonable cause to
believe that his action was in violation of law. Such an exclusion seems
broad enough to apply to private damage claims under Rule 1Ob-5, based
on "scienter" as defined in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,163 unless the action
taken was merely reckless, in good faith, and without knowledge of or
reason to believe in illegality.'64
If the lawyer-director is held to be a deputy for his law firm, it is
doubtful whether his partners and his law firm will be covered for vicarious
liability imposed upon them because of his derelictions as a corporate
director and not as an attorney.
III. CONCLUSION
There are no general or ABA prohibitions against corporate counsel
also serving as a corporate director.1 65 However, a member of the law firm,
which is outside counsel to a publicly-held corporation, who puts on a
second hat as a corporate director assumes substantial additional
responsibilities and, in today's legal climate, compounds his already
complex liability picture.
Plaintiffs' attorneys continue to search for the "deep pocket" from
which to obtain large settlements or collect substantial judgments.
Lawyer-directors, potentially insured by large liability insurance policies,
make ideal targets, especially in those cases where the prime culprits have
become judgment proof.166
159. Gates & Zily, supra note 14, at 333; W. KNEPPER, supra note 42, at 657.
160. Gates & Zilly, supra note 14, at 324.
161. See Call, Attorneys' Malpractice Insurance-Does Your Policy Cover Rule 1ob-5
Liability?, 30 Bus. LAW. 1095 (1975).
162. W. KNEPPER, supra note 42, at 656.
163. 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976), reh. denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976).
164. W. KNEPPER, supra note 42, at 634. See also Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553
F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977).
165. Shipman II, supra note 29, at 283.
166. W. KNEPPER, supra note 42, at 654.
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